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Abstract. Using lobbying data from OpenSecrets.org, we offer several
experiments applying machine learning techniques to predict if a piece
of legislation (US bill) has been subjected to lobbying activities or not.
We also investigate the influence of the intensity of the lobbying activity
on how discernible a lobbied bill is from one that was not subject to
lobbying. We compare the performance of a number of different models
(logistic regression, random forest, CNN and LSTM) and text embedding
representations (BOW, TF-IDF, GloVe, Law2Vec). We report results of
above 0.85% ROC AUC scores, and 78% accuracy. Model performance
significantly improves (95% ROC AUC, and 88% accuracy) when bills
with higher lobbying intensity are looked at. We also propose a method
that could be used for unlabelled data. Through this we show that there
is a considerably large number of previously unlabelled US bills where our
predictions suggest that some lobbying activity took place. We believe
our method could potentially contribute to the enforcement of the US
Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) by indicating the bills that were likely
to have been affected by lobbying but were not filed as such.
Keywords: lobbying · rent seeking · text classification · US bills
1 Introduction
Lobbying consumes a significant amount of resources, which surpasses the money
spent for example on campaign contributions. OpenSecrets.org reports that lob-
bying expenditure reached around $3.55 billion in 2010 (although it has started
declining slowly since then, dropping to $3.24 billion by 2013). US lobbying reg-
ulations ensure that much of the lobbying activities are disclosed to the public.
As a result, there is ample information on the particulars of lobbying activities,
and the access to this large amount of data has spurred numerous empirical
works on lobbying [6].
The main contribution of this paper is a novel way to gauge whether a piece
of legislation was lobbied or not. For this, we start on the premise that lobby-
ing changes the text of legislation in a way that makes them discernible from
? We thank the Center for Responsive Politics (OpenSecrets.org) for making their
lobbying data available.
2non-lobbied legislation. Take rent seeking for example. When businesses compete
they earn normal profit as a result of the competitive process in the market. An
obvious way to increase profits is to either collude, or monopolise the market,
both of which would be blocked by antitrust agencies. The easiest way for com-
panies to achieve super-normal profit is by lobbying governments to introduce
laws and regulations that ensure that they are sheltered from competition. The
economics literature calls this phenomenon rent seeking, referring to the objec-
tive of lobbying businesses to appropriate this rent (i.e. super-normal profit).
Rent seeking is hugely harmful for society, firstly because large amounts of re-
sources are spent on a non-productive activity (lobbying), but also because the
resulting markets are less competitive, meaning higher prices and therefore re-
duced welfare for consumers. We posit that if these legislative provisions, offering
preferential treatment to certain interest groups, are similar across the various
pieces of legislation, then the text of lobbied legislation should be discernible
from non-lobbied ones.
For this we rely on a database of lobbying activity in the US, and experiment
with a number of text classification methods. In this respect our work diverges
from previous works that apply text classification to expedite and improve the
handling of large amounts of legal documents. By training a model to distinguish
between lobbied and non-lobbied bills, our main objective is to improve legal
analysis by discovering classification rules that had been unknown to human
analysts.
This is important for multiple reasons. First of all, records on whether a
bill had been lobbied may be incomplete. A classification algorithm could help
ascertain if unlabelled bills have been lobbied or not. Second, although the US
system is more transparent, the same is not true in jurisdictions where lobbying
regulations are relatively new. For example, in the European Union there is very
little information on the laws that are targeted by lobbyists. Using a model
trained on US law we could investigate the use of transfer learning together with
a much smaller sample of hand-labelled EU data to work on a model fitted to EU
laws. Finally, our fitted model can also be informative for gauging the amount
of rent seeking in the economy. Although not all lobbying activities should be
considered as rent seeking, lobbying facilitates rent seeking - in a similar logic
as in [13]. Moreover, [15] estimated that lobbying activity accounts for around
2/3 of all rent seeking related welfare loss, with the figure being higher in more
concentrated, and lower in less concentrated industries.
As another contribution, the paper also tests the impact of more intensive
lobbying. From the economics and finance literature we know that stakeholders
with the largest expected profits from favourable policies and regulations are
most likely to lobby most intensively[12]. For this reason we expected more
intensive lobbying associated with more discernible (for the algorithm) features
when compared to non-lobbied legislation.
Using standard natural language processing (NLP) tools, we train a number
of different models to classify bills into lobbied and non-lobbied groups. In par-
ticular, we used logistic regression, random forest and neural networks models. In
3our first, simple experiments, we achieve above 0.85 AUC and accuracy of 78%.
As a next step we show that lobbying intensity improves model performance,
up to 0.95 AUC and 88% of accuracy implying that intensively lobbied bills are
more different from non-lobbied ones (following our assumption that these are
more likely to be subject to rent-seeking).
We also propose a method that could be used for unlabelled data (legislative
bills, where we do not have any information about lobbying). Through this we
show that there is a considerably large number of previously unlabelled US bills
where our predictions suggest that some lobbying activity took place. This is
more likely to be in certain areas, such as energy and healthcare. We believe our
method could potentially contribute to the enforcement of the US Lobbying Dis-
closure Act (LDA) by indicating the bills that were likely to have been affected
by lobbying but were not filed as such.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next Section describes the
literature review in this domain. In Section 3, we introduce the dataset, and
Section 4 describes the results of our analysis. Finally, we conclude in Section 6
with some future directions.
2 Related works
In general, there is an increasing amount of literature that applies NLP in the
legal domain [5]. Some of these focus more on solutions to automate summarising
legal texts, such as court rulings [7] or [11], applying SVM and naive Bayes clas-
sification of individual sentences to Bag of Words, TF-IDF, and dense features
in order to improve summary precision.
A subset of these applied NLP works in law draws on text classification
methods. For example, [2] use text classification methods (TF-IDF for feature
extraction and SVM for text classification) in order to classify which domain a
legal text belongs to. In another paper, [14] propose a semi-supervised learning
method to classify legal texts. In this model the first step is the unsupervised
learning of text region embedding, which is then fed into a supervised CNN.
Finally, a large number of NLP applications in law focus on prediction. [18]
set out to predict various aspects of patent litigation, with mixed results. Other
works focus on the prediction of court rulings, such as the European Court of
Human Rights (ECRH) decisions by [1], or French Supreme Court rulings by
[17].
There is a well-established body of literature on lobbying, and it is beyond
the remits of this paper to provide an overview of these. In a systematic review of
the relevant empirical works, [6] takes account of the main strands of empirical
papers and the challenges to empirical research on lobbying. It also discusses the
advantages, disadvantages, and effective use of the main types of data available.
Nevertheless, none of these reviewed works used methods similar to ours.
The closest we can relate our paper to previous literature is in the area looking
at the impact of lobbying on the specific bills they are targeting. [9] found a
direct association between lobbying activities and bill outcomes, and that public
4attention reduces the effects of lobbying efforts, suggesting that lobbying is most
effective when focused on less salient issues. In another paper, [19] looks at the
difference between bills that were lobbied ex post and those lobbied before they
were passed. Finally, in [10] the authors look at the determinants of interest group
lobbying on particular bills after the bills have been passed, and identifies the
areas where lobbying focusing on the implementation (rather than the formation)
of legislation is more likely.
3 Dataset
The data was downloaded from the Center for Responsive Politics. The dataset
contains detailed information on a large number of lobbying instances. For the
purposes of this paper our focus is on the legislative bills that were lobbied. At
the time of downloading the data (Dec 2018) the data contained information
on lobbying activities related to 54,713 US bills. Table 1 shows the breakdown
of these bills by bill type - most of them are House of Representative Bills or
Senate Bills.
Table 1: Lobbied legislative bills by bill type
bill type n
House Concurrent Resolution (H.Con.Res) 334
House Joint Resolution (H.J.Res) 348
House of Representatives Bill (H.R.) 31879
House Resolution (H.Res) 1290
Senate Bill (S.) 19938
Senate Concurrent Resolution (S.Con.Res) 150
Senate Joint Resolution (S.J.Res) 177
Senate Resolution (S.Res) 597
We downloaded all bills available in text format from the US Congress’ web-
site.3 We then marked out the bills that had been lobbied, and then matched
it with a similar sample (n=48,411) of other bills where we had no evidence
that there was any lobbying and thus, we assumed that there was no lobbying
in these cases.4 This resulted in a total sample of 103,243 labelled bills (54,377
lobbied, 48,530 non-lobbied). Table 2 shows the breakdown of the sample into
subject areas.
We also tested how much lobbying-intensity affected classification perfor-
mance. The reason we thought this was important, was that lobbying activities
3 An example of a House Bill is given here: https://www.congress.gov/bill/
114th-congress/house-bill/3791/text.
4 In the US, lobbying activities (above a certain threshold) need to be disclosed, and
non-compliance can result in a pecuniary sanction (fine) or, in some cases up to 5
years imprisonment. In Section 5 we revisit this assumption.
5Table 2: Number of bills by subject area and lobbying activity
subject not lobbied lobbied
Agriculture and Food 675 1130
Animals 206 322
Armed Forces and National Security 3001 4067
Arts, Culture, Religion 304 58
Civil Rights and Liberties, Minority Issues 507 382
Commemorations 3934 414
Commerce 756 1411
Congress 3928 849
Crime and Law Enforcement 1949 2622
Economics and Public Finance 716 975
Education 1824 2474
Emergency Management 546 799
Energy 716 1847
Environmental Protection 692 1452
Families 370 259
Finance and Financial Sector 723 2086
Foreign Trade and International Finance 3657 3567
Government Operations and Politics 2719 2664
Health 3364 6943
Housing and Community Development 405 806
Immigration 836 1245
International Affairs 4107 2008
Labor and Employment 786 1355
Law 558 673
Native Americans 549 653
Private Legislation 838 203
Public Lands and Natural Resources 2728 2883
Science, Technology, Communications 595 1205
Social Sciences and History 64 18
Social Welfare 726 771
Sports and Recreation 420 93
Taxation 3485 5679
Transportation and Public Works 1120 2114
Water Resources Development 607 644
are largely heterogeneous. For example, some lobbying activities might not lead
to changes in the text of the legislation. Intuitively, less intensive lobbying is
less likely to lead to any changes in legislative provisions. Also, some lobbying
can be benign, and more likely to make only small changes to a given piece of
legislation. On the other hand, for lobbying driven by rent seeking the same is
probably not true. We posit that businesses with more to gain from lobbying
(rent seeking) are more likely to lobby intensively, and therefore lobbying inten-
sity is more likely to be correlated with having provisions in a bill that make
these lobbied bills different from non-lobbied ones. To test this, we introduce the
information we had on lobbying intensity into the way we labelled our data.
In Table 3 we show the number of bills associated with different levels of
lobbying intensity. Around a half of the bills in our sample were not lobbied,
roughly another quarter of them were lobbied between 1-10 times, and the rest
even more frequently.
For our analysis we created different labels to reflect lobbying intensity. Let
lobbied denotes the number of times a bill was lobbied, then, we created three
versions of the datasets using following logic:
D1 =
{
1 if lobbied ≥ 1
0 if lobbied = 0
(1)
6D2 =
{
1 if lobbied ≥ 10
0 if lobbied = 0
(2)
D3 =
{
1 if lobbied ≥ 50
0 if lobbied = 0
(3)
Table 3: Number of bills exposed to different levels of lobbying intensity
Number of times lobbied Number of bills
(0.0] 48530
(1.0, 5.0] 18511
(5.0, 10.0] 7338
(10.0, 50.0] 14924
(50.0, 100.0] 5072
(100.0, 200.0] 3836
(200.0, 500.0] 3003
(500.0, 1000.0] 1136
(1000.0, ] 893
We used these labels to create three balanced ’datasets’, with D1 mapping
out dataset 1 and so on. The respective sample sizes of datasets for label D1,
D2 and D3, are 103,243, 57,728 (28,864 lobbied and non-lobbied respectively),
and 27,880 bills (13,940 lobbied and non-lobbied respectively).
4 Evaluation
In this section, we present the results of our evaluation. First, we describe the
algorithms (Section 4.1), next, the metrics we used for evaluating our approach
(Section 4.2), then, the overall approach for text pre-processing, feature gen-
eration, and hyperparameter tuning is discussed (Section 4.3) and finally, we
present the results (Section 4.4).
4.1 Problem modeling and Algorithms
We modeled the problem as a binary classification task. Our objective was to
classify a given document into one of the two categories, that is, if the document
has been lobbied or not. To solve this task, we used three types of algorithms:
logistic regression, random forests,[3] and neural networks, more specifically, us-
ing recurrent neural networks (LSTM). We also experiment with various fea-
ture extraction algorithms such as bag of words (BOW), term frequency-inverse
document frequency (TF-IDF), word embeddings for neural networks, and a
domain specific Law2Vec embedding, which we chose, given our task relates to
7legal documents.[4] The primary motivation behind the selected machine learn-
ing algorithms is to experiment with approaches considered conventional (such
as logistic regression and random forests), and compare them with deep learning
models (LSTM, CNN) that are good in capturing sequential patterns in the data.
To make our findings useful for the legal domain, we needed to offer interpretable
results. For this reason it was important for us to investigate, for example, how
well an interpretable model (like the logistic regression) compares to black-box
networks for our classification tasks and how different feature extractions and
word-encoding approaches contribute to the performance results.
4.2 Metrics
We checked the performance of our three algorithms using two main classification
metrics: accuracy (ACC) and area under a receiver operating characteristic curve
(AUC ROC).
1. Accuracy: is defined as a ratio of correctly classified observations to the
number of all observations. The perfect binary classifier will have 100% ac-
curacy, and random binary classifier has 50% of accuracy on a balanced
dataset.
2. AUC ROC: is equal to the probability that a classifier will rank a randomly
chosen positive observation higher than a randomly chosen negative one.
AUC ROC is calculated by plotting true positive rate against the false-
positive rate at different thresholds. True positive rate is the proportion of
actual positives that are identified correctly, and the false-positive rate is the
ratio between the false positives and the total actual negative cases. After
that the area of this curve is calculated to get AUC ROC. The perfect binary
classifier will have AUC ROC equal to 1, and in a random binary classifier
ROC AUC equals to 0.5.
4.3 Approach
Our pipeline consists of the following three steps.
1. Data Cleaning: We applied conventional text pre-processing steps to our
raw documents (the text of bills). In particular, we lowercase the text, deleted
numbers, English stopwords, law stopwords, special characters and punctu-
ation from the text. After that, for each word, we perform lemmatisation.
For the logistic and random forest, we did not truncate or pad the sentences.
However, due to computational issues in using the LSTM model, we set a
max size for the sentence to be the average sentence length after the first
part of our pre-processing pipeline. After that, we truncated all the sen-
tences which were above the mean length. Those sentences that are below
the defined length are padded with special tokens.
2. Feature creation: Next, we transformed the preprocessed text into a set of
features that can be fitted into a machine learning model. For logistic regres-
sion and random forest we used TF-IDF on bag of n-grams and bag of words
8approach for text representation with a dictionary size set to 25000. For the
neural network, we used 300 dimensional GloVe word embeddings,[16] and
Law2Vec 200 dimensional embeddings.
3. Hyperparameter tuning: Finally, we hypertuned the model using algorithm-
specific parameters on the validation dataset, where we tried to find param-
eters that maximize AUC ROC. For example, we searched for the best value
of n for the models trained using TF-IDF on a bag of n-grams. In particular,
for logistic regression, we grid searched the best parameters for regulariza-
tion strength, and penalty type. In case of random forest, we experimented
with a larger set of hyperparameters such as maximum tree depth, splitting
criteria, minimum samples per split, and minimum leaf size. For neural net-
works, we experimented only with different optimization algorithms and the
number of recurrent layers.
After the best parameters have been determined, we then used the validation
dataset to find the threshold that maximizes the accuracy. Finally, we ran our
experiments on a test set and reported the accuracy using the best threshold we
found on the validation dataset.
4.4 Results
We perform our experiments using three different versions of the dataset, which
aims to capture lobbying intensity through different labeling, as explained in
Section 3. We denoted these as Labelling 1, 2, and 3. The corresponding results
are reported in Table 4. In each of these three versions of the dataset, we split
the data into train, validation, and test sets with proportions of 72% for train,
8% for validation, and 20% for test, respectively.
It appears that the best performing model and feature sets are logistic re-
gressions with TF-IDF, and LSTM with GloVe embeddings. In many text clas-
sification applications neural networks with word embeddings work better than
other models [8], especially when researchers have access to a large corpus of
text data. We observe this in our case as well, especially if one looks at Table
4. Regarding the word embedding representations, we TF-IDF provides the best
AUC ROC and accuracy on the test sample. Interestingly, Law2Vec is slightly
outperformed by both GloVe and TF-IDF.
The performance of the logistic model stands out. This would suggest that in
our binary classification problem the classes (lobbied - non-lobbied) are linearly
separable. On the other hand, the performance of deep learning models did not
exceed the logistic regression, which is likely to be down to the relatively small
size of our sample. In the most informative model that compares high-intensity
lobbied bills with non-lobbied bills (Labelling 3), we have 13,217 lobbied and
14,915 non-lobbied bills. This is small, especially given that our median bill
length is 4790 words (the mean is 10413), so each observation contains a very
large number of features. It is likely that there are complex non-linear relation-
ships between these features and the classes, but to fully explore this complexity
we would need much larger samples. Another possible reason is that the logistic
9regression model, compared to neural network do not need sophisticated and
time consuming hyperparameter tuning. Due to computation limitations we are
not able to explore a large set of possible hyperparameters for the neural net-
work models. On the other hand, it is true that the good performance of the
logistic model also suggests that there are clear features (such as the frequency
of specific n-grams) in these bills, which form a linear relationship with our two
classes. This is crucial in our application (text classification in Law), where inter-
pretability is very important for users. In Section 4.5 we provide an introduction
to these key features.
Table 4: Classification results - results for our three labels
Model
Validation Test
AUC ROC ACC. AUC ROC ACC.
Labelling 1
Logistic regression (TF-IDF) 0.8566 77.51% 0.8609 78.19%
Logistic regression (BOW) 0.8233 74.58% 0.8253 74.72%
Random forest (TF-IDF) 0.8451 76.23% 0.8498 76.72%
LSTM (GloVe 300d. embeddings) 0.8658 78.12% 0.8652 78.31%
LSTM (Law2Vec 200d. embeddings) 0.8514 77.24% 0.8503 77.21%
CNN (GloVe 300d. embeddings) 0.8520 77.14% 0.8550 77.68 %
CNN (Law2Vec 200d. embeddings) 0.8529 76.71% 0.8501 76.71%
Labelling 2
Logistic regression (TF-IDF) 0.9318 85.95% 0.9321 85.73%
Logistic regression (BOW) 0.8337 82.20% 0.8920 81.19%
Random forest (TF-IDF) 0.9169 83.83% 0.9179 83.39%
LSTM (GloVe 300d. embeddings) 0.9334 86.14% 0.9300 85.61%
LSTM (Law2Vec 200d. embeddings) 0.9204 84.35% 0.9222 84.25%
CNN (GloVe 300d. embeddings) 0.9251 84.95% 0.9280 85.16%
CNN (Law2Vec 200d. embeddings) 0.9240 84.98% 0.9257 84.87%
Labelling 3
Logistic regression (TF-IDF) 0.9557 88.79% 0.9548 88.79%
Logistic regression (BOW) 0.9129 84.54% 0.9128 84.16%
Random forest (TF-IDF) 0.9431 86.69% 0.9430 85.80%
LSTM (GloVe 300d. embeddings) 0.9505 89.38% 0.9447 87.86%
LSTM (Law2Vec 200d. embeddings) 0.9406 86.91% 0.9393 86.37%
CNN (GloVe 300d. embeddings) 0.9519 88.70% 0.9487 88.00%
CNN (Law2Vec 200d. embeddings) 0.9450 87.14% 0.9459 87.05%
Comparison of the three sets of results clearly indicates that the prediction
improves as we re-define our label in terms of lobbying intensity. In the first
experiment (top section of Table 4) we compare bills that were not lobbied,
with bills that were lobbied, irrespective of the number of times. This provides
the worst results. This is in line with intuition: it is likely that bills that were
lobbied only once are not hugely different from those that were not lobbied at
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all (for example, the lobbying might have been for a benign, minor correction
of the text, or the lobbying might have not successfully changed the text of the
legislation at all).
For Labelling 2 (middle section of Table 4) and 3 (bottom section of Table
4) the results show improvement. In these experiments we compared bills that
were not lobbied with bills that were lobbied intensively, at least 10, and at least
50 times respectively. The results suggest that the difference between the text
of lobbied and non-lobbied bills becomes more discernible where there is more
intensive lobbying. Put differently, a bill that was not lobbied is more similar to
a bill that was lobbied only once, than to a bill that was lobbied, say, 20 times.
4.5 Interpretation of the most important features
In this subsection, we make an attempt to explain which features played the most
important role in generating our results. The good performance of the logistic
model means that we have a better chance to interpret what features are driving
our classification algorithm.
We extracted the most important features using the logistic regression model
with TF-IDF algorithm on a bag of unigrams and bigrams, trained on the dataset
with Labelling 3 (as this labelling gave us the best performance). Among the
most important features we can find congress appropriation, which refers to ap-
propriation bills i.e. bills that decide on how to allocate federal funds to various
specific federal government departments, agencies and programs. Increased lob-
bying activity of these bills that directly decide on how to spend money are not
surprising.
Scanning through the 100 most important features, one also finds a list of
senator names: Cartwright, Polis, Roe, Murphy, Reed, Kelly. It is likely that bills
introduced by these Senators received more lobbying than bills introduced by
others, which is why we pick up their names among the top features.
The top feature list also contains a number of terms that are typically as-
sociated with legislation that limit competition in one way or another. Terms
like exception, reauthorization, protection, prevent, copyright, patent, are possi-
ble signs of the regulatory protection of some market players, or the creation of
regulatory monopolies through patents or copyrights.
Finally, one can also see patterns of the sectors and topics where more lob-
bying happens, such as finance: insurance, health saving, credit union, share
agreement, flood insurance, saving, tax freedom; public health: abortion, care as-
sistance, overdose, smoker, cancer screening ; infrastructure: infrastructure, build-
ing code, federal land ; or associated with socially controversial topics: abortion,
marriage, partnership, ammunition, gender identity.
Looking at each subject more specifically can lead us to more fine-tuned fea-
ture importance discussions. For lack of space we cannot discuss all of these, but
we provide some examples. Looking at bills on Foreign Trade and International
Finance, Figure 1 shows preference, protection, credit, subsidy, and extension
among the positive features (indicating higher probability of lobbying). This is
not surprising, these terms are typically associated with various trade barriers,
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one of the prime manifestations of successful rent seeking lobbying by US-based
producers. Other features, such as combination and partnership are signs of
export/import partnership, which are often the subject of trade-related rent
seeking activities. Of course, finding import, export, or currency (words that are
inherent in trade related documents) among the important features shows that
our selection of stopwords would have to be further fine-tuned to each subject
area specifically.
Fig. 1: Most important positive words for Foreign Trade and International Fi-
nance
5 Application to unlabelled data
As mentioned earlier, one of the limitations of using the OpenSecrects.org data
is that it only labels the bills that were lobbied, making the implicit assumption
that all unlabelled bills were not lobbied. As explained above, in the US, lobbying
activities are required to be disclosed, violations of which can lead to severe
penalties. Nevertheless, there has been over 14,000 such violations since 1995,5
which would suggest that non-compliance is a non-trivial problem. Our proposed
approach below offers a way to verify if those bills that are not entered in the
OpenSecrets.org database have been subject to similar lobbying activities as
those that are listed by OpenSecrets.org.
In our experiment, we downloaded all available bills from the US Congress’
website (254,806 bills). As very old bills could have had different wordings, and
5 https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2017/11/
what-is-the-lobbying-disclosure-act-lda
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short bills are likely to have limited amount of information for our analysis, we
constrained this sample to bills after 1990, and bills that were at least 2000
word long, which left us with a sample of 81,998 bills. From the lobbied bills we
only used the ones where there was intensive lobbying (50 instances or more),
i.e. where we were most certain to find distinctive features due to the lobbying
(13,940 bills).
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Fig. 2: Extracting information from non-labelled data
First, to estimate a model that predicts lobbying in a bill, we took our 13,940
lobbied bills (labelled as lobbied), and used cross-validation to take 5 rotated
samples (each consisting of 81,998/5=16,399 bills) from the unlabelled bills and
labelled them as non-lobbied. This cross-validation exercise is shown on Figure
2. Then we estimated our model (using a logistic model given its relatively good
performance and speed) and deployed it on the remaining unlabelled sample
to predict the probability that a given unlabelled bill was lobbied. We then
moved on to the next iteration, where we used the same lobbied sample, but
another 16,399 unlabelled bills were selected and labelled as non-lobbied. Then
we estimated our model for this new set of labelled bills, and deployed it on
the remaining sample, and so on. For each unlabelled bill and for each iteration,
we stored the estimated probability that it was lobbied. The five batches in
our iterations gave us 4 predictions for each unlabelled bill. We then took the
13
average of these 4 predictions as a probability that an unlabelled bill was directly
or indirectly affected by lobbying activity.
Figure 3 plots these average probabilities over time (calendar quarter of the
release of the bill). This shows an increasing trend in the percentage of unlabelled
bills being affected by lobbying, indicating, that for more recent bills, almost
half had at least a 50% probability that they were affected by lobbying, and
almost 10% of unlabelled bills were predicted to have been lobbied with over
90% probability.
Fig. 3: Proportion of non-labelled bills with evidence of lobbying
Finally, Table 5 presents the proportion of unlabelled bills where we pre-
dicted a high probability of lobbying activity, broken down to subject areas. To
preserve space we only report 10 subject areas with the highest probability. It
shows that in subjects such as Energy, Finance and Financial Sector, Science
and Technology, and Health around 5% of the unlabelled bills were affected by
lobbying with more than 90% probability. To give an example, the GREENER
Fuels Act (S.2519 and H.R.5212) was most likely to have been lobbied but was
not recorded as such on OpenSecrets.org at the time of us accessing the data
(Dec 2018). It is possible that there is a lag in recording lobbied bills, but even
if this is the case, and if these bills were later added to the lobbied list, it would
confirm that our model made the right prediction.
The above findings can imply two things. In the US all lobbying activity
has to be reported but our findings suggest that there are bills that have not
been filed under the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA), but carry the hallmarks
of lobbied bills. First, these bills could have been indirectly affected by lobbying
(i.e. were not lobbied but the legislator designed them in a way that made
them similar to lobbied bills). There is also a possibility that not all bill-specific
lobbying activity is reported, and the the OpenSecrets.org data is incomplete.
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Table 5: The proportion of unlabelled bills with evidence of lobbying by subject
area (top 10 highest probability subjects)
subject
Lobbied with
>50% probability
Lobbied with
>75% probability
Lobbied with
>90% probability
Total number of
unlabelled bills
Energy 0.4144 0.1799 0.0674 1262
Finance and Financial Sector 0.3737 0.1698 0.0554 1678
Commerce 0.3302 0.1101 0.0259 1508
Emergency Management 0.3052 0.1381 0.0442 724
Science, Technology, Communications 0.2989 0.1346 0.0503 1114
Health 0.2850 0.1221 0.0420 6453
Labor and Employment 0.2576 0.0761 0.0172 1747
Transportation and Public Works 0.2437 0.0865 0.0177 2208
Environmental Protection 0.2309 0.0939 0.0271 1884
Immigration 0.2261 0.0745 0.0232 1464
Our proposed method could improve the data OpenSecrets.org holds, and
could potentially contribute to the enforcement of the LDA by indicating the
bills that were also likely to have been affected by lobbying but were not filed as
such by the parties involved in the lobbying.
6 Conclusion
Many times the automation of handling large amounts of legal documents comes
from the desire to improve work efficiency by substituting out human handling
of cases. We believe our paper belongs in a different group. Even humans with
the highest level of domain specific expertise on lobbying, legislation, and rent
seeking would struggle to mark out those bills that had been targeted by lobby-
ing. We propose the training of an algorithm to find patterns that distinguish
lobbied bills from non-lobbied ones.
For the legal field to learn from this exercise, our future work will focus on a
more detailed analysis of what factors are important in the distinction between
the two types of bills. For this we would also like to perform more exhaustive
experiments, looking at how our results change with time, with subject area,
or with the identity of the lobbying organisation - all of which is available in
our dataset - affects our results. Because our linear models perform well, it
has the appeal to make it interpretable, which is important for social science
applications.
Moreover, we would also like to experiment with transfer learning (domain
adaptation) and examine if our model, together with a small sample of labelled
data from another English-speaking jurisdiction, can be used to predict lobbying
activity in countries where such data is less easily available than in the US.
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